Wagners Serious Injury Lawyer Blog

Personal injury lawyers for an injured car accident victim successfully argued that correctness of a trial decision awarding damages for his brain injury.

The injured man was involved in a car accident several years ago. He unfortunately suffered a brain injury resulting in cognitive decline. On his behalf, personal injury lawyers in Nova Scotia brought an action against the individual whose negligence caused the car accident. The amount of damages was contested. The injured man argued that his brain injury resulted in a diminished capacity to earning future income.

He argued that he would be less marketable to future employers and that his career opportunities were more limited. Lawyers for the defendant's insurance company argued that his work capacity (and future income) was not affected by the car accident. The parties were unable to settle the claim before trial.

After a five day trial in Nova Scotia, the trial judge agreed with the injured man. He summed up the factual background as follows:

Richard Vogler, a very bright and popular twenty year old from Halifax, was asleep in the back seat with his seatbelt unbuckled when the gust from a passing tractor trailer sent the mobile home into a fishtail. The driver could not keep control. Mr. Vogler was hurled from the car as it crashed.

Mr. Vogler hit the ground with the kind of violence that causes the brain to bang against the inside of the skull. Also, the skull was fractured, and his brain suffered blunt trauma from that. The flesh of Mr. Vogler's right forearm was horribly torn, and one eye was badly damaged. His right chest was punctured and his lung bruised. Ribs and the pelvis were fractured.

For a time the question was whether Mr. Vogler would die. He lived. Then, the main question was what would be left of his faculties. He made a remarkable recovery thanks to good hospital care in the United States and Canada, to his parents' intense campaign of treatment involving professionals, family, and friends, to Mr. Vogler's own intellectual and spiritual strengths, and to sheer luck.

That much said, Mr. Vogler suffered brain injuries that were severe in the beginning, and there are some lasting effects. The extent and consequences of those losses are the most controversial issues for assessing Mr. Vogler's damages.

On these facts, the trial judge awarded the injured man general non-pecuniary damages (pain and suffering) at $150,000.00. He assessed damages for loss of income earning capacity at $180,000.00. The defendants appealed these awards to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal found in favour of the injured man and dismissed the appeal. The Court reasoned as follows:

The trial judge had very extensive medical and other evidence before him, and was in an ideal position to determine the severity of the injuries for assessment purposes. His assessment was $150,000.00, for the combination of brain inury and loss of vision - each of which would alone command a significant award - and for the other injuries suffered. The appellants say this award is too high. We disagree. It is within the range of reasonable outcomes for the severe injuries suffered by the respondent.

Regarding the assessment of damages for loss of future income, or income earning capacity, the trial judge acknowledged the challenging task and noted that it involved making educated guesses about the life trajectory that Mr. Vogler would have enjoyed, but for the accident, and comparing this to the life that he is currently living.

On the basis of considerable evidence it was the trial judge's conclusion that the injuries have led to "information processing and memory deficits", and that but for the accident, Mr. Vogler would have been capable of "meaningful work". The result being that his injuries would probably translate into lower earnings in the future. Consistent with the case law, he opted to use a "global" rather than an actuarial approach and arrived at a figure for loss of future income earning capacity of $180,000.00. The appellants argue that this assessment is contrary to the evidence. Again we disagree. There was more than ample evidence to support the trial judge's findings and conclusions in making his award of loss of future earning capacity.

Essentially, lawyers for the defendant's insurance company tried to argue that there was not enough evidence to support an award for diminished future earning capacity. The Courts disagreed. It is impossible to know what an injured person's work situation would have been "but for" the injuries. However the Courts observed in this case that judges must make an "educated guess". If this "guess" leads to the conclusion that the life trajectory has been altered by the accident, and therefore future income loss is "probable", a loss of future earning capacity award will be granted.

In this case, the car accident caused "information processing deficits". It is impossible to know whether these deficits would result in a loss of future income, but the judge ultimately used an "educated guess" to conclude that they would. This case is an important affirmation from the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal of on the threshold required for a future earning capacity award.

Personal injury comes in many forms. Victims of intentional or unintentional wrongs can suffer a range of physical and emotional harms. Where such harms are suffered, the law permits compensation. For example, when a pedestrian is hit by a car while crossing a crosswalk, and is injured, he or she can seek damages from the driver. A victim of a sexual assault, who suffers emotional consequences like depression, is entitled to compensation from his or her attacker.

Entitlement to compensation for some injuries is less obvious. One such example is an invasion of privacy. Victims of privacy breaches often suffer emotional consequences, such as embarrassment, loss of confidence and degradation. A couple of months ago, the Ontario Court of Appeal released a decision that clarified whether such injuries, stemming from a breach of privacy, are compensable under law.

The defendant was a bank employee. Over a four year period she accessed the plaintiff's banking records more than 174 times. The accessed information included not only transaction details, but also address, date of birth, and marital status. No information had been published, distributed, or recorded by the defendant in any way. Other than the defendant being in a relationship with the plaintiff's ex-husband, it was not clear why she was viewing these records. She acted in breach of bank policy.

The plaintiff brought a claim for invasion of privacy and sought general and exemplary damages.

The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for having suffered an invasion of privacy. The Court of Appeal confirmed the existence of a right of action for intrusion upon seclusion, stating:

For over one hundred years, technological change has motivated the legal protection of the individual's right to privacy. In modern times, the pace of technological change has accelerated exponentially. Legal scholars such as Peter Burns have written of "the pressing need to preserve 'privacy' which is being threatened by science and technology to the point of surrender" ... The internet and digital technology have brought an enormous change in the way we communicate and in our capacity to capture, store and retrieve information. As the facts of this case indicate, routinely kept electronic data bases render our most personal financial information vulnerable. Sensitive information as to our health is similarly available, as are records of the books we have borrowed or bought, the movies we have rented or downloaded, where we have shopped, where we have travelled, and the nature of our communications by cell phone, e-mail or text message.

The Court described the analysis that must be entered into in assessing the viability of a claim for intrusion upon seclusion:

I would essentially adopt as the elements of the action for intrusion upon seclusion the Restatement (Second) of Torts(2010) formulation which, for the sake of convenience, I repeat here:

One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the invasion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.

The key features of this cause of action are, first, that the defendant's conduct must be intentional, within which I would include reckless; second that the defendant must have invaded, without lawful justification, the plaintiff's private affairs or concerns; and third, that a reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish. However, proof of harm to a recognized economic interest is not an element of the cause of action. I return below to the question of damages, but state here that I believe it important to emphasize that given the intangible nature of the interest protected, damages for intrusion upon seclusion will ordinarily be measured by a modest conventional sum.

The Court found, on the facts of the case, the claim was made out - the intrusion was intention and it would be highly offensive to the reasonable person. In determining the level of damages the Court said:

Favouring a higher award is the fact that Tsige's actions were deliberate and repeated and arose from a complex web of domestic arrangements likely to provoke strong feelings and animosity. Jones was understandably very upset by the intrusion into her private financial affairs. On the other hand, Jones suffered no public embarrassment or harm to her health, welfare, social, business or financial position and Tsige has apologized for her conduct and made genuine attempts to make amends. On balance, I would place this case at the mid-point of the range I have identified and award damages in the amount of $10,000.

This recent decision is expected to have wide-reaching consequences in civil litigation, particularly in the area of class actions where company decisions can have privacy implications for large populations of people. The case represents the recognition of a common law privacy tort in Canada's largest province and is significant milestone in the development of this area of the common law.

Lawyers for a young man tragically injured in a car accident many years ago finally achieved justice on his behalf following a recent trial.

The case stemmed from a serious car accident which took place in Wyoming in 2000. The victim was a 20-year-old who was a passenger in a car driven by his friend. The vehicle was towing a mobile home. With the victim asleep in the back seat of the car, the mobile home fishtailed after being passed by a large truck. The driver lost control of the car and the victim was hurled from the vehicle as it crashed.

The victim's head banged against the pavement. His brain suffered blunt trauma by violently hitting the inside of his skull. His eye was badly damaged, his right chest and lungs punctured and his ribs and pelvis were fractured. He was taken to Hospital where he remained for a long time during a difficult period of recovery. Many of his injuries healed. Unfortunately, he continues to suffer from personal injuries, the most significant of which is a lasting brain injury. His cognitive injuries were described as follows:

Attention: Mr. Vogler showed reduced focus on specific topics (staying with a specific visual, auditory or motor activity), reduced sustaining attention (completing a schedule, organizing papers such as his portfolio). Mr. Vogler showed intermittent "shutter effect" or "blanking out" during the task in which he "forgot" what we were working on, mild distractability, mild reduction in shifting attention (alternating between two tasks) and reduced divided attention (doing two things at once).

Memory: Mr. Vogler had difficulty recalling what was said to him and did not use rehearsal strategies on a consistent basis. He had intermittent lapses in information processing specifically during the middle of the message and at times of fatigue. Immediate, recent and prospective memory (forward planning) were reduced as was task planning, initiation, execution, speed, organization of information and time management.

Word Retrieval: Mr. Vogler showed borderline-mild word retrieval difficulty. He used circumlocution, verbal mazing or word substitution occasionally. This became exaccerbated [sic] during fatigue.

Thought formulation: Mr. Vogler showed reduced information processing through reduced speed of responding, reduced accuracy and reduced problem solving skills. This was not apparent when asked to problem solve neutral topics such as what would you do if you lost your keys but did not show strategic problem solving during personal experiences such as losing a bag that had his scarf and assignment in it at the hospital. Identification of alternate solutions (flexability) [sic] was reduced.

Social communication: Mr. Vogler showed a borderline-mild degree of redundancy, tangential humor/comment and reduced awareness of others' perspective.

After hearing evidence from a variety of medical experts and hearing from the victim, his friends and his family, the Court awarded him damages. In assessing pain and suffering, the Court favoured the "functional approach", where the purchase of comforts to balance the loss of vision, brain impediments, stiffness and sufferings inform the analysis. The Court considered the cost of a college education under the functional analysis. It awarded $150,000 to provide some solace related to the victim's intellectual impairments.

The young man did not have a long history of pre-injury earnings to definitively inform the Court what his income would have been "but for" the accident. The Court then used its "best estimate" to "attempt to put the injured party in the position the party would have enjoyed if the accident had not occurred."

The Court accepted that the victim would earn less over this lifetime due to his injuries. In quantifying this loss, the Court hypothesized what he would have done but for the accident. The Court then awarded a global sum of $180,000.

Halifax personal injury lawyers for the victim successfully argued for other heads of damage. In the end, the insurance company defending the claim was ordered to pay a total judgment of $485,972, plus costs.

We see this as a great result for a heartbreaking set of circumstances. Unhappy with having to pay the permanently injured young man the awarded level of compensation, the insurance company is appealing the ruling. We will update on the outcome of the appeal.

Earlier this summer, a New Brunswick Court, in Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company v. Johnston assessed and awarded damages to the victim of a serious car accident.

The car accident victim is a New Brunswick resident. She and her son were struck by an uninsured driver in 2006. She suffered serious physical injuries as a result of the accident. She was diagnosed with right and left wrist fractures; right pelvic fractures; right hip fractures, right and left tibia fractures and a laceration of the left scalp. She underwent several surgeries as a result of her injuries. It was also determined that she suffered a closed head injury as a result of this accident. She suffered a severe traumatic brain injury.

Lawyers commenced actions on their behalf against their insurance company to recover insurance benefits pursuant to Section D, uninsured automobile coverage of their standard policy. This protects drivers in the event they are harmed by an insured or unidentified driver.

Lawyers presented the expert opinions of the accident victim's doctors. Among the more relevant opinions, her doctors stated:

"At the time of the motor vehicle accident of 2006, [she] was reported by her treating caregivers to be in a state of remission from psychotic symptomatology, and was, at the time, compliant with suggested treatment. Whether or not compliance would have ensued, is also moot, given her previous history of non-compliance, even when "things were going well." Independent living for [her] would have been somewhat precarious, although possible, with close outpatient supervision prior t the accident of 2006."

"...the motor vehicle accident of November 15, 2006 dramatically changed [her] life. ...She has greatly reduced function at this point and requires supervision to ensure that she does not inadvertently harm herself. This may be the situation for the prolonged future or even for the remainder of her life. She will be unable to return to work."

"This woman sustained severe injuries in the accident in question. She had a severe traumatic brain injury. She has been left with residua from this in the form of mental fatigue, slowing of information processing and problems with divide attention. Language is generally intact, calculating ability is intact. She has some difficulties with changes in set and maintaining set. The Wisconsin Card Storing Test showed a number of errors of failure to maintain set....

Her memory is significantly affected, both for verbal and visual information....

There are significant compromises of her functional capacity...."

The victim's lawyers researched many cases across Canada where people were regrettably similarly severely injured. They presented the Court with results of the research to help the judge decide the appropriate quantum of damages.

After hearing the totality of the evidence and submissions, the Judge awarded this unfortunate car accident victim $200,000 for pain and suffering, $40,000 for income loss and $565,570 to contribute to her cost of future care together with her costs and disbursements.

The insurance company was ordered to pay the car accident victim a total award of $805,570.

As a result of another driver's negligence, this lady suffered life-altering injuries. The injuries are permanent. While financial compensation will not heal her injuries, it is the way the Canadian legal system recompense injury victims. This New Brunswick lady hired personal injury lawyers. They did the necessary research and made appropriate submissions to the New Brunswick Court to guide the decision-making process. The circumstances of this case were unfortunate but it is hoped that the Court award will provide this injured lady with the means necessary to continue to treat her injuries and improve her altered lifestyle.

It is welcome news to victims of car accidents, and other cases of negligence, in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and PEI that the Supreme Court of Canada recently denied leave to hear the Defendant appeal of the appellate decision in Bradley v. Groves. The Court of Appeal in that case made it easier for individuals to recover damages for "indivisible" injuries. Where an accident victim suffers injury in multiple events (like two different car accidents) and it is impossible for a judge to separate the injuries arising from the events, the victim is said to have an "indivisible" injury. In the car accident example, the acts of two negligent defendant drivers will have combined to create an injury that is not attributable to one particular defendant. Whereas, in a divisible injury case, multiple parties will contribute only to specific discrete injuries and each party is only responsible for the harm they personally cause.

Victims of an "indivisible" injury deserve compensation. The seminal question is in the case of multiple accidents is: which negligent party liable for paying the damages? Bradley v. Groves is a welcome decision in that it makes it easier for accident victims to recover damages for "indivisible" injuries. Summarized, the Court of Appeal ruled that if multiple parties contribute to one indivisible injury they are all 100% responsible for the indivisible injury regardless of the fact that each party only contributed to causing the injury to some degree. The Court confirmed that if two or more incidents caused an indivisible injury the victim can sue any of the parties responsible for causing the harm and recover the whole of the loss.

The plaintiff in Bradley v. Groves was involved in two car accidents several months apart. She claimed damages against the driver who caused the first accident. His insurer argued that the plaintiff's ongoing injuries were the result of the second accident. After hearing all the evidence, the judge was unable to parse out to what degree each accident had injured the plaintiff. He found that she had sustained an "indivisible" injury. Stemming from the finding, the judge ordered that the first defendant pay the entirety of the plaintiff's damages. On appeal, the Court found no error in this logic, stating:

[32] There can be no question that Athey requires joint and several liability for indivisible injuries. Once a trial judge has concluded as a fact that an injury is indivisible, then the tortfeasors are jointly liable to the plaintiff. They can still seek apportionment (contribution and indemnity) from each other, but absent contributory negligence, the plaintiff can claim the entire amount from any of them.

[33] The approach to apportionment in Long v. Thiessen is therefore no longer applicable to indivisible injuries. The reason is that Long v. Thiessen pre-supposes divisibility: Long requires courts to take a single injury and divide it up into constituent causes or points in time, and assess damages twice; once on the day before the second tort, and once at trial. Each defendant is responsible only for their share of the injury and the plaintiff can recover only the appropriate portion from each tortfeasor.

[34] That approach is logically incompatible with the concept of an indivisible injury. If an injury cannot be divided into distinct parts, then joint liability to the plaintiff cannot be apportioned either. It is clear that tortfeasors causing or contributing to a single, indivisible injury are jointly liable to the plaintiff. This in no way restricts the tortfeasors' right to apportionment as between themselves under the Negligence Act, but it is a matter of indifference to the plaintiff, who may claim the entire amount from any defendant.

[35] This is not a case of this Court overturning itself, because aspects of Long v. Thiessen were necessarily overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions in Athey, E.D.G., and Blackwater. Other courts have also come to this same conclusion: see Misko v. Doe, 2007 ONCA 660, 286 D.L.R. (4th) 304 at para. 17.

[36] It may be that this represents an extension of pecuniary liability for consecutive or concurrent tortfeasors who contribute to an indivisible injury. We do not think it can be said that the Supreme Court of Canada was unmindful of that consequence. Moreover, apportionment legislation can potentially remedy injustice to defendants by letting them claim contribution and indemnity as against one another.

[37] We are also unable to accept the appellant's submission that "aggravation" and "indivisibility" are qualitatively different, and require different legal approaches. If a trial judge finds on the facts of a particular case that subsequent tortious action has merged with prior tortious action to create an injury that is not attributable to one particular tortfeasor, then a finding of indivisibility is inevitable. That one tort made worse what another tort created does not automatically implicate a thin or crumbling skull approach (as in Blackwater), if the injuries cannot be distinguished from one another on the facts. Those doctrines deal with finding the plaintiff's original position, not with apportioning liability. The first accident remains a cause of the entire indivisible injury suffered by the plaintiff under the "but for" approach to causation endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, 2007 SCC 7, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333. As noted by McLachlin C.J.C. in that case, showing that there are multiple causes for an injury will not excuse any particular tortfeasor found to have caused an injury on a "but-for" test, as "there is more than one potential cause in virtually all litigated cases of negligence" (at para. 19). It may be that in some cases, earlier injury and later injury to the same region of the body are divisible. While it will lie for the trial judge to decide in the circumstances of each case, it is difficult to see how the worsening of a single injury could be divided up.

The only possible downside to the benefits of Bradley v. Groves is this: If you suffer an indivisible injury and receive compensation for it from one negligent person a subsequent defendant may be able to reduce his/her liability by the amount of the previous settlement or judgement.

This drawback highlights the importance of speaking to an experienced lawyer prior to settling any claim for damages with an insurance company.

Car accidents, slip and falls and medical errors are daily occurrences in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and P.E.I. They are often the result of someone's negligence and the victims of such incidents will usually suffer injuries of some sort.

Tragically some will suffer injuries of a catastrophic nature. Some of these severe injuries can include brain damage, spinal cord injuries, quadriplegia, and birthing damage like cerebral palsy.

Victims who suffer such injuries as a result of another's negligence are, under law, entitled to compensation for the "pain and suffering" they will endure over the course of their lifetime. Such awards are referred to as "non-pecuniary damages" and are intended to compensate the victim for the loss of enjoyment of life he or she will go through as a result of the debilitating injury.

The monetary evaluation of a victim's pain and suffering cannot be done using a calculator. The evaluation is a philosophical one. While understanding that no amount of money will adequately compensate for a catastrophic, debilitating injury, judges and juries are nonetheless tasked with making the assessment. Logic says that the greater a person's suffering, the greater the damages. However, this is not the case.

In 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada in the seminal case of Andrews v. Grand & Toy adopted as the appropriate award in the case of a young adult quadriplegic, the amount of $100,000 in general damages. The Court stated that this should be regarded as an upper limit of non-pecuniary loss in catastrophic cases (later, in In Lindal v. Lindal, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that this cap amount should be allowed to grow with inflation). Presently, the cap is a little over $300,000.

On the surface, this may sound like a lot of money. However, for a young man who is rendered paralyzed in a car accident and who has to spend the rest of his life in a wheelchair, or a young girl who suffers brain damages as a result of a doctor's negligence, this amount is small consolation.

The imposed upper limit has been the subject of much criticism from the members of the public, lawyers and various lower courts, particularly in the context of jury awards. It is felt by many that it is time for the Supreme Court of Canada to revisit the "upper limit".

The 2006 case of Lee v. Dawson presented a good opportunity. The plaintiff in that case was a 17 year old boy who was injured in a car accident as a result of another driver's negligence. As a result, he sustained permanent brain injury which caused severe depression, a permanently impaired psychological growth and a facial disfigurement. After hearing all of the evidence, a jury of his peers awarded him $2 million dollars for his pain and suffering. This was reduced by the judge to the "upper limit". The boy appealed and advanced the following arguments:

(i) The language used to describe the rough upper limit in the trilogy referred to the rough upper limit not as a strict rule of law, but as a guideline, the purpose of which was to set a "rough upper parameter" on non-pecuniary loss;

(ii) Time and judicial experience with the rough upper limit have demonstrated that it has been converted into a strict rule of law, which is a role that ought to have been left to the legislature. The fact that the guideline has been converted into a strict rule of law is demonstrated by the fact that since the trilogy, no court has awarded or upheld a non-pecuniary award that exceeds the guideline amount;

(iii) Twenty-five years have passed since the trilogy set out the upper limit. The policy reasons that justified its adoption no longer exist, and the continued imposition of the rough upper limit is not justified;

(iv) In the trilogy, the Supreme Court noted that the possibility of having an extravagant claim was higher with respect to non-pecuniary damages because of the difficulties with quantification of the injuries for which non-pecuniary damages compensate. In the plaintiff's submission, difficulty in quantification does not relieve the court of its obligation to determine the issue;

(v) In the trilogy, the Supreme Court was concerned that non-pecuniary damages might be awarded on the basis of improper considerations such as sympathy for the plaintiff, a desire to punish the defendant, or a perception of the defendant's "deep pockets". The plaintiff submits that a solution that is more rationally connected to this potential problem than an upper limit is a jury instruction that warns of the impropriety of these considerations;

(vi) The Supreme Court in the trilogy expressed concern that non-pecuniary awards were increasing but that conclusion was not arrived at on the basis of any empirical evidence. Subsequent studies have demonstrated that the notion of sky-rocketing non-pecuniary awards is a false perception;

(vii) A further policy consideration that was contemplated in the trilogy was that pecuniary awards provide the plaintiff with full compensation, and non-pecuniary awards should, therefore, be modest. The plaintiff argues that that conclusion assumes perfect compensation with respect to other heads of damage, and ignores other costs that might impair the ability of pecuniary awards to provide perfect compensation. Additionally, each head of damages is intended to address a specific loss, and non-pecuniary losses are not unique in this regard. The amount of non-pecuniary loss that is suffered is not contingent on the pecuniary losses the plaintiff has sustained;

(viii) In the trilogy, the Supreme Court was concerned with the high social impact of high non-pecuniary awards. It highlighted increased insurance premiums as an example. The plaintiff submits that again, the Court made an assumption in the absence of evidence capable of supporting it;

(ix) The rough upper limit disregards juries, and the importance of juries outweighs any hypothetical benefits that the guideline might bestow. The plaintiff argues that the jury is the only trier of fact capable of keeping up with the rapid pace of social, economic and technological change in our society. The imposition of the rough upper limit precludes juries from addressing these questions, with the result that the values of the community, as represented by the jury, are ignored. Moreover, the limit forces this Court to apply different standards to low jury awards and high jury awards. When reviewing a low award, the Court of Appeal applies the palpable or overriding error standard, on the assumption there is some evidentiary basis for the low award whereas a high award is reviewed on the comparative approach, thus ignoring the deference which ought to be shown to the factual findings of juries;

The Court of Appeal found these arguments compelling but stated that they were not in a position to overturn the upper limit imposed by the Supreme Court of Canada. When the accident victim asked for his case to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, he was refused.

It is difficult to reconcile the deference Judges and Appellate Courts must give to a jury's decision with a rule that automatically replaces their award if it's deemed too high. This serves to undercut the basic value of the jury.

What good is a body that supposedly uniquely qualified to assess the damages suffered by an injured victim (because they are members of the victim's community) when their award is subsequently reviewed and modified by judges (who are usually not members of that community)?

The lawyers at Wagners have seen first hand the prejudice caused by imposing an upper limit the damages that can be awarded to a severely accident victim. It is believed that with time, progress will be made and the law modified such that it can be better reflective of community values. In today's society, with rising athlete salaries and CEO bonuses, the community conscious (reflective in a jury award) would award a far greater sum of money than $300,000 for a young disabled victim of a tragic accident. It is time for the Courts to appreciate this change in the community conscious and get ride of, or raise, the upper limit on general damages.